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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-2592
___________
WILLIAM F. KAETZ,
Appellant
v.
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION;
EXPERIAN; TRANSUNION; EQUIFAX
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-09225)
District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 25, 2022
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 4, 2022)
____________________________________

___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
William Kaetz, proceeding pro se, appeals orders of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey dismissing his second amended complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Kaetz filed a complaint against Educational Credit Management Corporation
(“ECMC”), and three credit reporting agencies, Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion (together, the “CRAs”), arising from actions taken to collect and report his student loan debt.1
Kaetz alleged that in 2012, he filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. He listed ECMC in his petition as a creditor with claims totaling $15,835, which represented his student loans. The Bankruptcy
Court granted Kaetz a discharge in 2013. Kaetz alleged that, after the discharge and completion of his bankruptcy case, ECMC used harassing telephone calls and letters to collect
the debt. ECMC also informed the CRAs about his debt and the CRAs published the information on his credit report. Kaetz averred that the debt was discharged and that he disputed
the debt without success.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
The operative complaint is Kaetz’s second amended complaint filed on November 29,
2017.
2

Kaetz claimed that the defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, that
the CRAs violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and that the defendants were in civil
contempt of the Bankruptcy Court’s discharge order. He also raised constitutional claims
challenging, among other things, the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Code provision
excepting student loan debt from discharge, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
ECMC moved to dismiss Kaetz’s second amended complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Experian and Equifax filed a joint motion to dismiss,
which TransUnion joined. The District Court granted the motions and dismissed Kaetz’s
complaint. It ruled that many of Kaetz’s claims failed because their premise—that his student loan debt was discharged in his bankruptcy case—was incorrect. The District Court
explained that student loan debt is presumptively nondischargeable under § 523(a)(8) and
that Kaetz had not filed an adversary proceeding to determine whether his debt could be
discharged.
Kaetz filed a motion for reconsideration. Relevant here, he disputed the District Court’s
conclusion that his student loan debts were not discharged in his bankruptcy case. He argued that he was not required to file an adversary proceeding and that he rebutted the presumption that his debt was nondischargeable by satisfying the exception in § 523(a)(8) for
undue hardship. The District Court ruled that Kaetz had provided no reason justifying reconsideration of its prior decision and denied relief. It stated that Kaetz did not point to a
change in law, new evidence, a clear error of law or fact, or manifest injustice, but had
restated arguments he had made in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The
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District Court reiterated that his student loan debt was not discharged in his bankruptcy
case. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s order dismissing Kaetz’s complaint. Finkelman v. Nat’l Football
League, 810 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2016). We review the District Court’s denial of his
motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Gibson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 994 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2021). We review its legal determinations on reconsideration de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id.
Kaetz primarily argues on appeal that the District Court erred in ruling that he was
required to file an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court to determine the dischargeability of his student loan debt. The applicable statute provides that “[a] discharge under
section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt” for
certain educational loans “unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). “Section
523(a)(8) renders student loan debt presumptively nondischargeable ‘unless’ a determination of undue hardship is made.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260,
277 n.13 (2010).

2

The District Court granted Kaetz leave to amend one of his claims against ECMC, but
Kaetz did not do so. Kaetz has stated that he stands on his second amended complaint and
there is thus no issue as to our appellate jurisdiction. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d
232, 240 (3d Cir. 2019). We also conclude that, while the District Court did not
acknowledge TransUnion’s joinder in the motion to dismiss filed by Experian and Equifax,
there remain no unresolved issues for resolution by the District Court. Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997).
4

Kaetz correctly states that § 538(a)(8) does not provide that an adversary proceeding is
required to determine whether student loan debt may be discharged. However, as the District Court recognized, “the Bankruptcy Rules require a party seeking to determine the dischargeability of a student loan debt to commence an adversary proceeding by serving a
summons and complaint on affected creditors.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 268–69. Kaetz contends that the Supreme Court’s statement in Espinosa in this regard is dicta.3 Regardless of
whether that statement is dicta, the Bankruptcy Rules set forth the applicable procedure.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6) (providing that adversary proceedings include “a proceeding
to determine the dischargeability of a debt”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, Adv. Committee
Notes (stating the rules govern procedural aspects of litigation involving matters referred
to in Rule 7001); see also Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 45152 (2004) (discussing the filing of an adversary proceeding under the Bankruptcy Rules to
discharge student loan debt).
Kaetz also contends that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that he was indigent
satisfied the undue hardship exception in § 538(a)(8) and rebutted the presumption that his
debt was nondischargeable. Even if an undue hardship determination could have been made
in Kaetz’s bankruptcy case outside of an adversary proceeding, a finding of indigence is
not the same as an undue hardship determination under § 538(a)(8). See In re Faish, 72 F.3d
298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding bankruptcy courts within the Third Circuit must apply the
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Espinosa held that a Bankruptcy Court legally erred in confirming a Chapter 13 plan that
discharged student loan debt without an undue hardship finding, but that the error was not
a basis for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Id. at 275-76.
5

undue hardship test in Brunner v. New York State Higher Educational Services Corporation, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam)); see also Hood, 541 U.S. at 450 (“Unless
the debtor affirmatively secures a hardship determination, the discharge order will not include a student loan debt.”).
Kaetz also argues that § 523(a)(8) is unconstitutionally vague. His argument on appeal,
however, is based on the fact that the statute does not direct the filing of an adversary
proceeding. As discussed above, the Bankruptcy Rules address the applicable procedure.
Kaetz has not established that the statute is constitutionally infirm.4
Kaetz has not shown that the District Court erred in dismissing his second amended
complaint or in denying his motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.5

4

In his reply brief, Kaetz contends that the term “undue hardship” is unconstitutionally
vague. To the extent this argument was raised below, Kaetz has forfeited it by not presenting it in his opening brief. There are no exceptional circumstances excusing the forfeiture.
See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 148 (3d Cir.
2017). Similarly, we do not consider Kaetz’s argument that his loan should be discharged
because the institution where he enrolled misrepresented the nature of its program, which
was not developed in his opening brief.
5

Kaetz’s pending motions, which seek leave to file and/or amend various documents, are
granted.
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